Maturing Subsidized Mortgages: The Next Frontier of the Expiring Use Crisis by Achtenberg, Emily
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Center for Social Policy Publications Center for Social Policy
1-1-2009
Maturing Subsidized Mortgages: The Next Frontier
of the Expiring Use Crisis
Emily Achtenberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/csp_pubs
Part of the Housing Law Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Occasional Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Social Policy at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Center for Social Policy Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please
contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achtenberg, Emily, "Maturing Subsidized Mortgages: The Next Frontier of the Expiring Use Crisis" (2009). Center for Social Policy
Publications. Paper 19.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/csp_pubs/19
 
 
 1 
  
 
CSP Working Paper # 2009-8 
 
MATURING SUBSIDIZED 
MORTGAGES: 
THE NEXT FRONTIER 
OF THE EXPIRING USE 
CRISIS 
 
 
Emily Achtenberg 
 
 
 
 2 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
MATURING SUBSIDIZED MORTGAGES: 
 THE NEXT FRONTIER OF THE EXPIRING USE CRISIS 
 
 
Emily Achtenberg 
Housing Policy & Development Consultant 
ejpa@aol.com 
 
Prepared for 
 
The Center for Social Policy, 
University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
The Boston Tenant Coalition 
 
 
 
 
 
April 28, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This analysis was made possible with data provided in part by the Community 
Economic Development Assistance Corporation  (CEDAC). 
 
Financial support was provided in part by the Hyams Foundation. 
 
The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of CEDAC, the Hyams Foundation,  
the University of Massachusetts Boston, or the Boston Tenant Coalition. 
 
 
 
 3 
  
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 Over the next decade, close to 17,000 units in 130 federally- and state-financed 
developments in Massachusetts could be lost as affordable housing as they reach the end 
of their 40-year subsidized mortgage terms. The maturing mortgage crisis represents the 
latest challenge to the privately-owned subsidized housing stock, its lower income 
residents, and the communities where these developments are located.  
 
 Since 1987, some 6,700 net affordable units have been lost as owners have prepaid 
their subsidized mortgages or opted out of their rental subsidy contracts. While 
Massachusetts has also had a strong track record in subsidized housing preservation, 
recent experiences with maturing mortgage properties--including the loss of more than 
800 affordable units at 3 Boston developments--suggest that new approaches will be 
needed in the future.  
 
 The study reveals some of the characteristics of this housing that pose special 
challenges for preservation and tenant protection, as well as the unique benefits that make 
these developments especially worth preserving.  
 
  While fewer than half the units have project-based rental subsidy, their rents are 
generally affordable to very low income households--a unique benefit offered by 
40-years of budget-based rent regulation. Without additional project-based 
subsidy, it will be very difficult to preserve the current occupancy profile of the 
housing in the future. 
 
  Many maturing mortgage properties are located in strong market neighborhoods 
where they are vulnerable to conversion pressures. Outside the major cities, the 
loss of an existing subsidized property will often put the municipality out of 
compliance with Chapter 40B. 
 
  Since Enhanced Vouchers (tenant-based rental subsidy) are not directly 
authorized when a subsidized mortgage expires, there is a substantial risk of 
tenant displacement. Even with Enhanced Vouchers, the unique role currently 
played by many of these properties in preserving racial and economic diversity in 
their communities will be lost upon tenant turnover.  
 
  While 20% of the units are at immediate risk (through 2010), 50% will not reach 
mortgage maturity until at least 2015. These properties provide a significant 
opportunity for cost-effective "preemptive" preservation.   
 
 To address these challenges, state legislation is needed to provide, at a minimum, a 
meaningful Right of First Offer and a Right of First Refusal to DHCD (or its designee) 
when a subsidized property is offered for sale, including adequate tenant protections (S. 
666/ H. 3573). Additionally, adequate state resources should be targeted to facilitate the 
acquisition and preservation of at-risk properties on a timely basis, and to permit 
qualified community-based non-profit purchasers to compete on a level playing field with 
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private buyers. To promote cost-effective preservation, MassHousing should permit high-
risk subsidized properties to refinance prior to mortgage maturity, in exchange for 
extended affordability restrictions. Finally, federal legislation is needed to permit owners 
to project-base Enhanced Vouchers and to expand the scope of Enhanced Voucher 
eligibility. 
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 MATURING SUBSIDIZED MORTGAGES:  
 THE NEXT FRONTIER OF THE EXPIRING USE CRISIS 
 
  
 
I. Introduction  
 Over approximately the next decade, close to 17,000 affordable housing units could 
be lost in Massachusetts as their federally- and state-subsidized mortgages mature, 
terminating all associated use and affordability restrictions. Most of this housing, 
developed 30-40 years ago under various federal and state mortgage subsidy programs, is 
only partially assisted with project-based Section 8 rental subsidy; but 100% of the units 
are affordable due to budget-based (and tiered) rent restrictions. 
 
 To the extent that the properties have Section 8 assistance, the maturing mortgage 
crisis overlaps with larger crisis of expiring Section 8 subsidy contracts. However, the 
unique characteristics of this housing (rent and occupancy structure, community context, 
and regulatory constraints) pose special risks and challenges for public policy. In 
particular, the partial nature of project-based Section 8 assistance makes it more difficult 
to preserve this housing. There is also a substantial risk of tenant displacement since 
Enhanced Vouchers are not directly authorized when a subsidized mortgage matures. 
Even with Enhanced Vouchers, the unique role currently played by many of these 
properties in preserving racial and economic diversity in their respective neighborhoods 
and communities will be lost upon tenant turnover.  
 
 Inadequate tools and funding currently exist to protect existing tenants and preserve 
these valuable affordable housing resources. The analysis of the maturing mortgage 
inventory which follows concludes with proposed legislative and policy initiatives to 
facilitate constructive solutions to this new expiring use challenge.   
 
II. Historical Background  
 The earliest subsidized mortgage properties were developed in the mid-1960s under 
the HUD Section 221(d)(3) Below-Market Interest Rate (BMIR) program, utilizing direct 
government loans. Later, interest subsidies were provided to private lenders under 
Section 236, with some projects insured by HUD and others financed directly by 
MassHousing. MassHousing also financed a number of properties under the state's 
Chapter 13A interest subsidy program. 
   
 Occupancy of these units was limited to low and moderate income families with 
initial incomes at or below 80% or 95% of area median (for 236/13A and BMIR projects, 
respectively). Rents were budget-based, including a fixed limited-dividend allowance. 
Many for-profit owners were permitted to prepay their 40-year subsidized mortgages "as 
of right" after 20 years. Others (including non-profits, certain owners who received HUD 
"flexible subsidy" rehab loans, and owners of MassHousing developments financed after 
August 1, 1973 or benefitting from subsequent mortgage increases) were subject to 
prepayment "lockouts" for the full mortgage term. 
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 In the mid-1980s, the "expiring use restriction" (EUR) crisis began with a wave of 
mortgage prepayments, including a few in Massachusetts. Subsequently, the federal 
government imposed a prepayment moratorium and developed new preservation 
initiatives under Title II (ELIHPA) and Title VI (LIHPRHA). These programs provided 
fair market value incentives to existing owners and purchasers, in the form of increased 
Section 8 subsidies and HUD-insured second mortgage loans for acquisition, rehab, and 
equity takeout.1
 Since 1996, approximately 15,300 federally- and state-assisted units have been lost in 
Massachusetts, primarily due to subsidized mortgage prepayments.
 In exchange, affordability restrictions were extended: under Title VI, for 
the remaining useful life of property (or at least 50 years); but under Title II, only for the 
remaining term of the subsidized mortgage. Between 1987 and 1995, approximately 
4,000 subsidized mortgage units in Massachusetts were permanently preserved under 
Title VI, while another 7,000 units were temporarily preserved under Title II.  
 
 In 1996, the federal government restored owners' prepayment rights and defunded the 
preservation programs. Instead, Enhanced Vouchers were provided to protect eligible low 
and (in some cases) moderate income tenants at the point of prepayment. Unlike regular 
vouchers, which are limited to the PHA's payment standard, Enhanced Vouchers are 
provided at the comparable market rent as long as the tenant chooses to remain in the 
housing. However, since the Enhanced Voucher moves with the tenant, upon turnover 
(absent other restrictions) the units are permanently lost from the affordable housing 
stock. 
 
2
                                                 
1Alternatively,  under Title VI many non-profit purchasers received direct capital grants.   
2CEDAC, "Massachusetts Projects with Subsidized Mortgages or HUD Project-Based 
Rental Assistance,"  December 2008; updated by Emily Achtenberg.  
 An estimated 8,600 
of these units have retained some degree of affordability--although generally not 
comparable to the original level--because the projects were sold or refinanced under 
programs requiring new affordability commitments. The balance of approximately 6,700 
affordable units have been permanently lost as affordable housing.   
 
 At the same time, the creative use of new federal tools in combination with state and 
local resources has facilitated the preservation of many expiring use developments. The 
Section 8 Mark Up to Market program has encouraged the renewal of existing project-
based rental subsidy contracts, while supporting new debt financing for acquisition and 
rehabilitation. For Section 236 projects, HUD's "decoupling" program has allowed the 
remaining interest subsidy stream to be redirected towards this new financing. In 
conjunction with these federal initiatives, the Commonwealth has provided Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits (9% and 4%), tax-exempt bond financing, and gap financing for 
preservation projects. In particular, the Capital Improvements Preservation Fund (CIPF) 
is targeted exclusively for the preservation of at-risk existing subsidized developments.   
 
III. Maturing Subsidized Mortgages: New Challenges 
 
 
 7 
  
 While Massachusetts has had a strong track record historically in preserving at-risk 
subsidized housing, recent experience with maturing mortgage properties suggests that 
circumstances may be changing. Now that the oldest properties are reaching the end of 
their subsidized mortgage terms, affordable units (with both mortgage and rental 
subsidies) are being lost at a rate not seen since repeal of the prepayment moratorium in 
1995. For example: 
 
  High Point Village, Camelot Court, and Brandywyne Village are three mixed-
income former BMIR developments located in strong market neighborhoods of 
Boston, that were formerly preserved under Title II. The properties provided a 
total of 1,084 affordable units, including: 66% very low income units (with 
project-based Section 8); 24% low income units, and 10% moderate income 
units. Upon mortgage maturity, the Section 8 contract was renewed only at 
Brandywyne (266 units). The balance of the Section 8 units (451), and all of the 
affordable low and moderate income units (367), were converted to market.  
While eligible tenants (excluding many at High Point who had already moved) 
received Enhanced Vouchers,3
 Within the past year, several maturing mortgage properties have been offered for sale 
on a competitive basis through national brokers, similar to the process utilized for 
 a total of 818 affordable units were permanently 
lost. 
 
  Bradford Apartments is a 160-unit former BMIR development located in 
downtown Lawrence that was partially assisted with Section 8 (100 units). Upon 
mortgage maturity, the Section 8 contract was terminated and rents were 
increased to market. While eligible tenants (excluding many who had already 
moved) eventually received Enhanced Vouchers, all 160 units were lost as 
affordable housing.  
 
  Subsequently, the property was offered as part of a portfolio sale through a 
national broker. The owner refused to accept offers from local CDC buyers. 
Fortunately, the successful bidder has received a commitment for tax-exempt 
bond financing and tax credits, although the financing has not yet closed. With 
the loss of rental subsidies, however, these units will be substantially less 
affordable than they were prior to mortgage maturity. 
 
  Brookline Coop is a 115-unit former BMIR property in Brookline that was 
developed as an affordable limited-equity cooperative (with no Section 8 
assistance). Upon mortgage maturity, the cooperative converted to condominium 
ownership with 32 units remaining affordable. Eighty-three affordable units were 
permanently lost.   
 
                                                 
3Enhanced Vouchers were provided at these developments, and at Bradford 
Apartments, because the owners were eligible to (and did) prepay their subsidized 
mortgages prior to maturity;  see below.  
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Bradford Apartments. Due to a combination of resource, timing, and regulatory 
constraints, it has been extremely difficult for local preservation buyers--especially 
community-based non-profits--to compete successfully in this market-driven system. 
Even if some units are ultimately preserved, the system encourages underestimation of 
property expenses and rehab needs and inflation of bid prices which is detrimental to the 
housing and increases the cost of preservation.   
 
IV.  Analysis of the At-Risk Maturing Subsidized Mortgage Inventory  
 A closer look at the maturing subsidized mortgage inventory reveals some of the 
characteristics of this housing that will make preservation (and tenant protection) 
extremely challenging, as well as the unique benefits that underscore the value of its 
preservation.   
 
General Characteristics 
 The analysis is based on 130 projects, containing 16,800 BMIR, 236, and 13A units,4 
whose mortgages will expire by the end of 2020, placing their existing affordability at 
risk.5
 Only 44% (7,344) of the mortgage subsidy units are additionally assisted with 
project-based rental subsidy. Of these, two-thirds (4,899) are Section 8 and the balance 
 Two-thirds of the developments, containing 60% of the units, are financed by 
MassHousing. The remaining one-third, containing 40% of the units, are or were HUD-
insured. 
 
 Sixty percent of the units are financed under Section 236, while 25% are 13A units 
and the remaining 15% are BMIR units. Twenty developments (containing 5,300 
mortgage subsidy units) are Title II properties that were previously preserved but are 
again at risk.  
 
 Fifteen projects (containing 1,850 units) appear to be owned directly by non-profits. 
As demonstrated by the Brookline coop example above, non-profit owners are not 
immune from market or development pressures. Additionally, many non-profit projects 
suffer from disinvestment and require substantial recapitalization and renovations. 
Accordingly, this housing is also considered to be at-risk.  
 
                                                 
4Another 1,660 market units in these developments, including some with project-based 
rental assistance, do not benefit from mortgage subsidy and are not considered in this 
analysis.  
5Subsidized mortgage projects previously preserved (with new restrictions expiring 
after 2020) are not included. These are mostly Title VI preservation projects, Low 
Income Tax Credit projects with long-term restrictions (allocations made in 1990 or 
later), and projects receiving other types of state financing tied to extended 
affordability.  Also not included are projects whose mortgage subsidies were previously 
lost through prepayment or maturity (regardless of whether some affordable units were 
retained by other means). 
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have rent supplement or RAP subsidies6
 Budget-Based Rents. While only a portion of the units are assisted with project-
based rental subsidy, rents in the non-assisted units
, which effectively terminate with the mortgage. 
Section 8 contracts (which can be renewed, extended, and, in many cases, "marked up to 
market") cover only 29% of the mortgage subsidy units, and are concentrated in 49 
developments. Eighty-one of the 130 developments (62%) have no project-based Section 
8 at all. Especially to the extent that non-Section 8 units are occupied by very low and 
lower income tenants (see below), this discrepancy poses a significant challenge for 
preservation of the housing and for tenant protection.  
 
Rents/ Affordability/ Income Mix 
7
 In 27 projects for which non-assisted unit rent data was readily available, the median/ 
average rent was 65% of FMR.
 generally appear to be quite 
affordable. This is a legacy of 40 years of budget-based rent regulation.  
 
8
                                                 
6These more limited forms of rental subsidy are typically found in developments 
financed by MassHousing. Most owners of HUD-insured projects were able to convert 
their rent supplement contracts to project-based Section 8 some years ago.  
7Throughout this report, "non-assisted" or "unassisted" units refers to units with 
mortgage subsidy but without project-based rental assistance. 
8In one development where rents exceed the FMR, all units are rent-assisted. 
 This rent level is generally affordable to households 
earning less than 50% of area median income, at 30% of income. Accordingly, the non-
assisted units in many maturing mortgage properties appear to constitute a resource for 
serving very low income and lower income households without rental subsidy--a unique 
benefit offered by this historically regulated, non-speculative housing stock. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many of these units are occupied by tenants with even lower 
incomes, paying more than 30% of income for rent.    
 
 Tiered Rents. The 20 Title II projects have a "tiered" rent structure for unassisted 
units, based on their historical occupancy profiles, which is designed to preserve mixed 
affordability levels. In many Title II projects, the occupancy profile--which owners are 
required to maintain "to the extent practicable"--reflects substantial low/moderate income 
diversity. At the same time, owners are not precluded from serving additional lower 
income households and must accommodate tenants whose incomes decline by 
reallocating them to lower profile (and rent) subtiers. As indicated by the following 
example of a suburban Title II property within Greater Boston (which was recently 
offered for sale), unassisted units in these projects may be currently serving a lower 
income population than the historical profile suggests:  
 
     Historical   Current  
     Profile   Profile 
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Very Low: <50% (S8)9
 40B Compliance. Outside the major cities, many properties are located in cities and 
towns that barely meet, or fall below, the 10% affordable housing requirement under 
Chapter 40B. In these localities, maturing mortgage properties constitute a significant 
proportion of the 40B affordable housing stock (e.g. 42% in Brewster, 57% in Lincoln, 
53% in Medford). The loss of these properties will make it much more difficult for the 
municipality to achieve or maintain 40B compliance.
   27%    27% 
Very Low: <50% (non S8)   -   26% 
Low 1: 51-60%    16%      8% 
Low 2: 61-70%   18%     7% 
Low 3: 71-80%   11%     9% 
Mod    81-95%   27%    23% 
 
Total    100%   100% 
 
 Vouchers. Finally, since the below-market rent structure in subsidized mortgage 
properties (both Title II and non-Title II) is typically well below the FMR/PHA voucher 
payment standard, very low income households with mobile vouchers are readily 
accommodated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of these developments have 
substantial occupancy by voucher-holders.  
 
Location/ Community Context 
 Location. At-risk maturing mortgage properties are dispersed throughout the state, 
with more than 40% of the units located in cities and towns inside Greater Boston. Many 
projects appear to be situated in strong market areas, both suburban and urban (e.g. 
within the City of Boston, in the South End, Hyde Park/Roslindale, and Fenway 
neighborhoods), where they are a key source of economic and racial diversity and are 
vulnerable to market conversion pressures. 
 
10
 A significant number of properties have Chapter 121A tax contracts which typically 
include low and moderate income use restrictions. However, since these contracts were 
executed when the projects were first developed and expire after 40 years, their relevance 
 In contrast to new 40B projects, 
which are often controversial, these existing developments have long been accepted as 
part of the neighborhood fabric.   
 
                                                 
9In Title II projects, all units occupied by very low income tenants at the time of 
preservation received project-based Section 8 subsidy. 
10Under current 40B rules, 100% of the units in a rental development that is at least 
25% affordable to households with incomes at or below 80% median are counted 
towards the 10% requirement. Termination of the affordability restrictions or subsidy 
contract generally causes the development to be removed from the 40B inventory,  with 
some exceptions. 
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diminishes as mortgage maturity approaches. A few properties have zoning or existing 
40B restrictions which may prove more useful. 
 
At-Risk Dates 
 Mortgage Subsidies. In general, HUD BMIR and 236 mortgages are maturing now 
through 2014. MassHousing 236 and 13A projects, built later and with longer mortgage 
terms, will mature starting in 2012 through 2020.  
 
 Twenty-one projects containing 20% (3,500) of the mortgage subsidy units are at 
immediate risk. This category covers projects with mortgages maturing before the end of 
2010, including several large Title II properties in and around Boston (e.g. Georgetown, 
Cummins Tower, Battles Farm). It also includes several prepayment-eligible (EUR) 
projects that are not subject to prepayment lockouts and can terminate their subsidized 
mortgages and restrictions at any time (e.g. Cambridge Court, Macarthur Terrace, 
Harborview Towers).11
 Prepayment Lockouts. With respect to projects that are not immediately at risk due 
to prepayment lockouts, a critical public policy issue is whether they should be permitted 
to refinance prior to maturity, in exchange for extended affordability restrictions. This 
  
 
 Another 35 projects containing 30% (4,800) of the mortgage subsidy units have 
mortgages that will reach maturity through 2015. The remaining 74 projects, containing 
half (8,500) of the units will reach maturity through 2020. While these properties are not 
immediately at risk, they may present important opportunities for preservation (see 
below). 
 
 Rental Subsidies. Eighteen percent of the rental subsidies are at risk through 2010, 
33% through 2015, and 48% through 2020. For Section 8 units, the at-risk dates generally 
track the mortgage expiration dates (except for EUR projects, where the Section 8 
contract is at risk on its own expiration date, e.g. Harborview Towers). In projects subject 
to prepayment lockouts, if the Section 8 contract expires before the mortgage (e.g. Hope 
In Action), it is assumed not to be at risk since the owner has little incentive to opt out. 
This is consistent with the history of Section 8 optouts in Massachusetts to date, which 
(with some exceptions) have occurred in only conjunction with mortgage prepayments 
and maturities.  
 
 Rent supplement and RAP contracts expire after 40 years or at mortgage maturity/ 
prepayment, whichever occurs first. In some cases (e.g. Madison Park III), these 
subsidies will expire before the mortgage matures, creating an unanticipated affordability 
gap for very low income tenants. 
 
                                                 
11These EUR projects could have prepaid their mortgages up to 20 years ago but, for 
any combination of reasons, did not. Some (e.g. Cambridge Court) are clearly located 
in strong housing markets where there is a substantial incentive to prepay.  
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could facilitate more cost-effective preservation of the housing, since the value of the 
property during the lockout period is restricted.  
 
 For example, at one extremely valuable Section 236 property in the Greater Boston 
area which is eight years away from mortgage maturity, current rents for a 3BR 
townhouse at $1,300 are approximately 50% of market ($2,650). The owner is seeking to 
sell the property now, and does not intend to wait. The appraised value today (taking into 
account the remaining period of extended use) is half the projected value on the date of 
market conversion.  
 
 To purchase the property, a preservation buyer will need to prepay and refinance the 
existing mortgage with tax-exempt bond financing at lower interest rates, which will also 
generate Low Income Housing Tax Credits. By purchasing today, the buyer will be able 
to "decouple" and utilize the remaining Section 236 interest subsidy stream, a resource 
that diminishes each year as mortgage maturity approaches. Prepayment will also trigger 
Enhanced Vouchers for eligible tenants (see below). In the absence of a viable 
preservation option, there is a substantial risk that the property will be sold to a 
speculative buyer in anticipation of future market-rate conversion.  
 
Tenant Protections/ Enhanced Vouchers 
 Relative to past expiring use situations, tenants in maturing mortgage properties are 
more vulnerable to displacement because Enhanced Vouchers are not guaranteed. While 
eligible tenants in any units subject to a Section 8 contract are entitled to Enhanced 
Vouchers if the owner opts out, the rules for non-Section 8 tenants--who occupy more 
than 70% of these units--are more complex.   
 
 Under current federal law, eligible non-Section 8 tenants can receive Enhanced 
Vouchers only if the owner is entitled to prepay the mortgage without HUD consent--and 
does in fact prepay prior to maturity. Projects that received Flexible Subsidy rehab loans 
may be approved for Enhanced Vouchers at HUD's discretion. HUD would also have to 
approve the provision of Enhanced Vouchers to Section 236 and Chapter 13A projects 
that are released by MassHousing from their historical prepayment locks. Certain types of 
projects, such as those owned by non-profits, require HUD consent to prepay and cannot 
receive enhanced vouchers.  
 
 In approximately 25% of the maturing mortgage subsidy units (located in 26 
properties), eligible tenants could receive Enhanced Vouchers if the owner agreed to 
prepay. In another 62% of the units (located in 82 properties), Enhanced Vouchers could 
be available with HUD consent (and MassHousing prepayment approval, with respect to 
MassHousing projects). In the remaining 12% of the units (17 projects), Enhanced 
Vouchers cannot be provided under current law--either because the owner is a non-profit 
or the subsidized mortgage has already been prepaid.  
 
V. Policy Implications 
 The challenges posed by maturing subsidized mortgages are occurring in the context 
of a profound economic and financial crisis when affordable housing resources in 
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Massachusetts (for both preservation and production of affordable housing) are extremely 
scarce. At the same time, the growing demand for affordable rental housing, fueled by 
rising unemployment and mortgage foreclosures, underscores the critical need to preserve 
existing subsidized housing resources. The Commonwealth's recent $4.5 million award 
from the MacArthur foundation provides an opportunity to refocus creative attention on 
preservation. The following proposed legislative, policy, and programmatic measures 
would greatly enhance opportunities for preservation.  
 
1. Right to Purchase 
 State legislation is needed to provide, at a minimum, a Right of First Offer and a 
Right of First Refusal to DHCD or its designee, when a subsidized property is offered for 
sale. Adequate time frames, public notice provisions, and tenant protections should be 
included. This is an essential first step to facilitate opportunities for preservation 
purchases, which cannot be accomplished within the market-oriented national 
competitive bid system utilized by most sellers. A compromise bill negotiated among 
owners, advocates, and DHCD passed the Senate last year, has been reintroduced, and 
should be approved.   
 
2. Preservation Financing 
 Tax exempt bond financing and associated 4% tax credits, which are currently in 
plentiful supply, should be made available for preservation transactions on a priority 
basis. State gap funding specifically targeted for preservation (including CIPF) should be 
expanded and awarded on a rolling basis, to accommodate the opportunistic nature of 
preservation transactions. The new Preservation Loan Fund, capitalized in part with 
MacArthur funding, should be aggressively utilized to facilitate the timely acquisition of 
at-risk properties pending the availability of permanent financing.  
 
3. Non-Profit Purchasers 
 Additional measures are needed to allow qualified community-based non-profit 
purchasers, who are especially disadvantaged in the current financial crisis, to compete 
on a level playing field with private buyers (both market- and preservation-oriented). 
These include timely access to adequate predevelopment funds both prior to site control 
(to develop competitive offers) and after (to secure acquisition and permanent financing). 
There is also a critical need for a pooled guarantee fund to enable non-profit purchasers 
to meet investor reserve requirements and secure tax credit equity for preservation 
transactions in today's challenging market.     
 
4. Prepayment Lockouts 
 MassHousing should permit the release of prepayment locks on subsidized mortgage 
properties in exchange for extended, long-term use and affordability restrictions, in order 
to facilitate cost-effective preservation. This is especially appropriate for properties at 
high risk of market conversion that are being offered for sale, or for properties requiring 
substantial rehabilitation. Recapitalizing owners and purchasers benefiting from the 
release of prepayment locks should be required to renew existing Section 8 contracts and 
to project-base Enhanced Vouchers, to the extent authorized by federal legislation (see 
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below). State preservation resources should be targeted to these projects on the same 
basis as projects which are at more immediate risk. 
 
5. Enhanced Vouchers/ Project-Basing 
 Federal legislation (currently pending in Senate SEVRA) should be enacted to permit 
owners to project-base Enhanced Vouchers, subject to PHA approval, and with 
retroactive application to tenants in projects who have already received Enhanced 
Vouchers. Additionally, owners should have the option of exchanging their Enhanced 
Vouchers for HUD project-based Section 8 authority, as recently proposed by 
MassHousing. The scope of Enhanced Voucher eligibility should also be extended more 
generally to maturing subsidized mortgage projects with prepayment lockouts, in 
exchange for a requirement to project-base the vouchers. These measures are critical both 
for preservation and tenant protection. 
 
Maturing Subsidized Mortgages at Risk Table 
